Source: Chair of the House Committee on Transportation

Today, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Peter DeFazio (D-OR), Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen (D-WA) and Subcommittee on Aviation Member Greg Stanton (D-AZ) asked Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Stephen Dickson to provide more complete responses to questions he was asked at a subcommittee hearing last month regarding efforts to hold Boeing accountable for two key issues regarding the 737 MAX. In the letter sent to FAA Administrator Dickson today, the Members asked what FAA has done, if anything, to hold Boeing employees who were responsible for Boeing’s apparent violation of its approved 737 MAX type design, as well as evidence of an internal plan to downplay the significance of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a system connected to two deadly 737 MAX crashes, accountable.

“[W]e are deeply troubled by the absence of rigorous accountability for Boeing’s past transgressions related to the 737 MAX and the FAA’s failure to hold those who violated the public’s trust accountable,” said the Members in the letter.

The first issue concerns Boeing’s handling of a non-functioning Angle of Attack (AOA) Disagree alert on more than 80 percent of MAX aircraft. After discovering the problem in August 2017, Boeing decided to wait nearly three years to fix the issue. In the meantime, Boeing continued to produce MAX aircraft with the nonfunctioning alert and the company failed to notify the FAA, its 737 MAX customers, or MAX pilots that the alert was not functioning until after the Lion Air crash in October 2018. A Boeing Authorized Representative, a Boeing employee authorized to conduct work on behalf of the FAA, concurred with Boeing’s decision to delay fixing the AOA Disagree alert. However, according to a letter then-Acting FAA Administrator Dan Elwell wrote to the committee in July 2019, “Although an AOA disagree message was not necessary to meet FAA safety regulations, once it was made part of the approved type design, it was required to be installed and functional on all 737 MAX airplanes Boeing produced.”

In today’s letter, the Members wrote, “Our committee highlighted this issue, and Boeing’s action, in our investigative report on the 737 MAX not because we believed it was a safety issue, but because it was clearly a glaring issue of lax accountability and oversight. Yet, to date, we are unaware of any actions the FAA has taken to hold Boeing accountable for violating the approved type design of the 737 MAX, knowingly continuing to manufacture the aircraft regardless of this known defect and failing to inform your agency—or 737 MAX customers—of this nonfunctioning component on the aircraft until after the Lion Air crash.”

The second issue addressed in the letter concerns a 2013 internal Boeing record, a copy of which was enclosed as part of the letter and can be found here, that was initially released as part of the committee’s investigation. It documents an explicit plan within Boeing to downplay the significance of MCAS externally, including to regulators. Meeting minutes in the document explained, “[i]f we emphasize MCAS is a new function, there may be a greater certification and training impact.” This set a plan in motion to limit the use of the MCAS nomenclature externally and to downplay the system as “new,” by describing it as “an addition to Speed Trim.” Multiple Boeing employees participated in formulating the plan and a Boeing Authorized Representative signed off on the plan.

The letter asks if FAA has spoken with the Authorized Representative who approved this plan, if FAA took any actions to hold any of the individuals engaged in formulating the plan to limit certification scrutiny and pilot training requirements accountable, and whether FAA regards the actions laid out in this plan as acceptable conduct by Boeing.

“We would like to know what, if any, actions FAA has taken to evaluate and investigate the efforts by Boeing to downplay MCAS, particularly to U.S. and foreign regulators,” wrote the Members in today’s letter. “We are interested in any actions by the FAA to hold individuals accountable for their actions.”

Although the letter focuses on two specific and highly questionable past actions Boeing took in regards to the 737 MAX, the Members emphasized that they were concerned that FAA ensure it is keeping a close eye on Boeing’s actions in regards to ongoing issues in other programs and noted that the bipartisan Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA), which is currently being implemented, will help strengthen the FAA’s ability “to perform effective safety regulation and oversight.”

The Members wrote, “With continuing issues with the Boeing 737 MAX and the 787, and the ongoing certification of the Boeing 777X, it is more critical than ever that the FAA takes its role as regulator seriously. FAA must fully investigate actions by Boeing or others that jeopardize the public’s safety or disregard FAA’s regulations and hold responsible parties accountable. Our hope is that with continued implementation of the ACSAA, issues like those discussed above do not arise in the future.”

A response from FAA was requested by December 13, 2021.

 

The full letter can be found below and here.

 

November 29, 2021